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ABSTRACT: Logical argument is one of the strongest kinds of argument, for it can be applied to any domain. In
the domain of law, however, many arguments which are not formally valid are still admissible. We consider these
arguments to be special-valid. On the other hand, Arguments which have false premises and false conclusions, or
false premises and true conclusions are unacceptable in law because in law nothing can follow from false
premises. The aim of a legal argument is to persuade audiences to accept the claim, and nobody can accept an
invalid argument rationally. In this sense, the validity of legal argument is the same as the soundness of logical
argument. Moreover, the premises of legal arguments such as factual propositions are not the facts themselves but
legal facts reconstructed by evidence. This paper distinguishes the logical content from the material content of an
argument formulates the special-validity system of argument in the framework of law from two perspectives: the
internal structure and external structure.
KEY WORDS: legal argument, internal valid, external valid

INTRODUCTION
Logic is a theory about the validity of arguments. Validity is almost always used in the sense of
deductive validity. Deductive validity has gained widespread acceptance among logicians. An
argument is said to be deductively valid if and only if it is logically impossible that the premises of
the argument are all true, while its conclusion is false. Deductive argument is one of the strongest
arguments for it can be applied to any domain. In the domain of law, however, many arguments
which are not consistent with the form of logic are still admissible. The expression deductive
validity also suggests that there may be other kinds of validity which do not satisfy the standards for
deductive validity. For example, in criminal cases, the decision only requires the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, it requires a much weaker standard based on a balance of
probabilities. These mean that argument in law is not so strict or strong as it is in logic.
Arguments have different modes. We can broadly split them into two groups, namely formal
deductive argument mode and informal argument modes. Informal argument is informal not only
with respect to the form of an argument, but also with respect to the content, which is a kind of
content between zero-content and material content. Here we call it logical content. Legal arguments
may adopt all these modes. However, argument in law needs more concrete content than what it
needs in logic. How can we judge which kind of argument in law is valid and which is invalid? We
need to enlarge the validity system of formal deductive argument to satisfy the admissibility of
argument in law. Robert Alexy (1989) divides legal argumentation into two parts: internal
justification and external justification. Based on this, we discuss the validity system of the argument
in law from two perspectives: internal structure and external structure. The internal validity includes
deductive valid, inductive valid and analogical valid; and the external validity includes the validity
of legal norms, of precedents and the validity of legal facts.
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1. ARGUMENT AND ITS VALIDITY
An argument is a connected series of statements or propositions, some of which are intended to
provide support, justification or evidence for the truth of another statement or proposition. It is
certainly true that long before Aristotle people were capable of recognizing and constructing valid
arguments. But Aristotle seems to have been the first to note the distinction between the form and
the content of an argument. In order to develop precise theory of good and bad arguments, we
should not only look primarily at the form or structure of arguments, but also at some other features
of arguments, such as their content or subject matter. In logic, a sound argument is an argument in
which: (1) all the premises are true and (2) the reasoning is valid. The second condition means the
argument must be formally valid, and the first condition concerns with the content of the argument.
In fact, the two conditions imply that the conclusion is true. Both validity and truth are necessary for
soundness and for probable of necessary truth of a conclusion.
Traditionally, the validity of a formal argument is represented by deductive validity. A
deductively valid argument is one in which if all its premises (reasons) were true, then its
conclusion would have to be true. And an inductively strong argument is an argument in which if all
its premises (reasons) were true, then its conclusion would very probably be true. And to appraise
an informal argument, one can use inductively validity, which means the information claimed to be
true in the premises does not contain all the information claimed to be true in the conclusion, but
makes it highly probably true in the conclusion. Based on this criterion, logicians define ‘valid
argument’ as follows: valid argument in general is argument in which if all its premises were true,
then its conclusion either would have to be true or would very probably be true. However, Stephen
Toulmin (1958) argues that the validity for argumentation outside mathematics does not depend on
the syntactic structure but on the disputational process in which they have been defended.
According to Toulmin an argument is valid if it can stand against criticism in a properly conducted
dispute. Moreover, Walton (1989) regards validity as a semantic concept which has to do with truth
and falsehood, and considers the semantic core of an argument as normally surrounded by
pragmatic structures which have to do with what the arguer may reasonably be taken to be
committed to in the context of dialogue. The basic property of a valid argument is that it never takes
you from true premises to a false conclusion. In other words, a valid argument must be
truth-preserving, meaning that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true as well
(Walton, 1989).
2. ARGUMENT IN LAW
In the practice of law, lawyers, judges, legislator or scholars usually use arguments to persuade
audiences to accept their claims. This course of justification is a kind of legal argument. Legal
argument is a matter of logic in conjunction with relevance. Legal argument is a part of a rational
persuasion dialogue aimed at a rational resolution of disagreement, and its conclusion may be a
factual description or value choice. Toulmin (1958) developed a way of analyzing arguments and
found an alternative model in legal argument. He states that it is necessary to make a case which
can justify an enforceable decision in law. The decision must draw on matters of fact, matters of
principle (common or statute law) and arguments which connect them. What all arguments have in
common is that we find facts (or data) in order to make a plausible claim (judicial decision). To
back the claim we must have warrants, or arguments, which may rely on matters of principle, laws
or other facts for their backing. The chance that our argument may be rebutted (by new evidence,
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by insufficient data) requires us to qualify that claim to avoid overstating it.
A formal argument requires an abstract general model, and its reasoning is monotonic, namely
inference from premises to a conclusion that is valid in all possible world. However, legal argument
represents material content within a valid legal framework. In a suit, the roles of parties are not
distributed equally. The defendant may not be willing to be in a court. The goal of argument
evaluation is to arrive at an accurate judgment of how probable the premises of an argument make
the conclusion, based on the evidence we have. Its reasoning is non-monotonic and plausible or
defeasible. That means if one adds new information to an argument may result in that some
propositions which may be inferred in a previous small argument could not be obtained. Therefore,
the validity of legal argument is not completely logical validity, but a kind of pragmatical validity or
even contingency, which we call special-validity. For example, evidence A supports the conclusion
of P, and evidence B supports the conclusion of P. A and B are both unable to deny each other
logically and it is necessary to weigh their reasons. To say that a proposition is plausible is not to
say that it is true, or even that it is probably true, but only that it is rational to presume it to be true,
at least provisionally. This means that it has some evidence in its favor, and that nothing has yet
been discovered to show that it is false or unlikely. The plausibility of legal argument has to do not
with its intrinsic truth or probability but with how consistent it is with other propositions that we are
prepared to accept.
Haack (1978) argues that if one takes serious account of the possibility of a logic which deals
with non-truth-bearing items, one is likely to need an extended conception of validity. For example,
validity for imperative logic would be preservation of satisfaction rather than preservation of truth.
Therefore, we should modify our formal theory to accommodate assessments of informal
arguments or to revise our view of the appropriate way to represent a legal argument. As foregoing,
logically, an argument is sound if premises are true and reasoning valid. In law, however, we can
not be satisfied with using this criterion: if the premises were true and the reasoning valid, then the
conclusion is true. If people were completely rational they would be persuaded only by valid
arguments with true premises. Because a legal argument is a kind of practical one, legal principle
requires the premises must be true. Any argument comprised with false premises makes no sense in
law. For a legal argument, the truth of premises has to be implicated in the validity of argument. The
aim of a legal argument is to persuade audiences to accept the claim, and no body can accept an
invalid argument rationally. In this sense, the validity of legal argument is the same as the soundness
of logical argument.
Legal argument can be distinguished into internal justification and external justification (Alexy,
1989). Internal justification is concerned with the question of whether an opinion follows logically
from the premises adduced as justifying it. The correctness of the premises is the subject-matter of
the external justification. Based on this idea, we can develop the validity system of argument in law
from two perspectives: internal validity and external validity (see Figure 1).
3. INTERNAL VALIDITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
Internal justification is developed from the aspect of form of an argument, namely it discusses
whether an argument can be reconstructed as a logically valid one which treat legal rules and facts
as premises and legal decision as a conclusion.
3.1. Deductively valid
Logically, a valid argument means it is a necessary inference from a premise set to a conclusion, i.e.
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the argument is deductively valid. A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a
form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid. Deductively valid can be divided into formal
deductively valid and material deductively valid. Formal deductive validity is system-relative. In a
logical system, validity can be defined both syntactically and semantically, i.e. in terms of the
axioms or rules of the system, and in terms of its interpretation (Haack, 1978, p. 13). Its validity can
be expressed as ‘it is logically impossible that the premises are true and the conclusion is false’. If
legal rules can be represented as the form of ‘if p then q’, and legal facts are p’s realistic examples;
then a legal conclusion can be obtained deductively from legal rules and facts; and then a verdict
which based on this legal conclusion is justified.
And that material deductively valid argument possesses of a warrant which can be entailed
from existent provisions. For example, argument ‘John is a bachelor, so John has never been
married’ is a deductively valid inference. Its warrant, ‘if anyone is a bachelor, then that person has
never been married’, is entailed by the definition of ‘bachelor’. And because the definition
represents a semantic rule, the warrant is a necessary truth. Thus, the inference is deductively valid,
even though not formally valid. This argument is valid not because of it logical form but because of
the material content of its non-logical term.
An essential property of logically valid argument is that it is truth-preserving, namely, it never
infers false conclusion from true premises. This makes logical validity become a strong tool to
analyze legal argument. People try to reconstruct legal arguments as logically valid arguments. By
virtue of the special properties of law, however, many legal arguments cannot be reconstructed as
logically valid arguments. How to deal with their validity? Some other extra-systematic ways which
are opposed to system-relativity should be considered.
3.2. Inductively valid
There are a good many arguments that are considered acceptable by rational people but lack
deductively valid inferences to support them. Inductive arguments are one kind. An inductive
argument is an argument in which it is thought that the premises provide reasons supporting the
probable truth of the conclusion. In the domain of law, we evaluate inductive argument by validity.
If the inductive strength of an argument is enough to make us believe that is almost impossible for
the conclusion is false, then we regard this inductive argument as a valid one. Therefore, the
inductive validity is a concept of degree. It can be expressed as following:
Inductively validity = True premises + Strong induction
Inductively validity can be conceived as presumptively validity or defeasibly validity. Toulmin
(1958) uses several examples to explain the concept of presumptive validity. One is ‘Peter is a
Swede, so [presumably] he is a Protestant’. It shows that an argument is inductively strong if its
premises give a certain degree of support, even if less than conclusive support, to its conclusion: if,
that is, it is improbable that its premises should be true and its conclusion false. Consider, for
example, the following inductive argument (Savellos and Galvan, 2000, p. 34):
(1) The victim was murdered at her home with a knife belonging to her ex-husband.
(2) Blood found on the murder weapon matches that of the ex-husband.
(3) There is evidence that there was a violent fight between the victim and the murderer
right before the murder, and the ex-husband has a history of violence toward his
ex-wife.
(4) Three witnesses testified that they saw the victim’s ex-husband’s car parked outside
the victim’s home at the estimated time of the death.
(5) Therefore, probably, the ex-husband is the murder.
Logically, even if these four premises were true, they also do not completely guarantee the
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truth of the conclusion. In this argument, however, the evidential support to the premises provided
for the conclusion is enough for us to infer that the falsity of the conclusion is highly unlikely
(beyond reasonable doubt). Inductive arguments gain or lose strength when additional relevant
information is added to the premises. For example, suppose we added a premise:
(a) Five witnesses testified that the ex-husband was with them (and not at the victim’s
home) at the time of the murder.
Premises (a) reduces the inductive strength and is enough to make the argument invalid.
Argument from expert opinion (Walton, 2002) is one of the most important inductive
arguments. Argument from expert opinion has the following general form:
（1） Source E is an expert in subject domain D containing proposition A.
（2） E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
（3） Therefore, A is true (false).
This form of argument is fallible because experts can be wrong. For an acceptable argument
from expert opinion, therefore, we should make sure that the following conditions are satisfied: (1)
the expert must be expertise on issues relevant to the subject matter of the argument. For example,
we cannot rely on the word of a musician when the issue is one of biology, and we cannot rely on
the word of a mathematician for legal matters unless she is a lawyer; (2) the experts must be
impartial. It means that the expert should be free of bias and prejudices because a perfect authority
should be unbiased and just; (3) the expert should have appropriate credentials. These may include
credentials such as degrees or licenses, hands-on experience, and recognition and respect from other
expert in the same area; and (4) it is founded on theories, methods and procedures which is
generally accepted as valid by other experts in the same field.
3.3. Analogical validity
Analogical argument is one of the very important arguments in law. Many people regard it as one of
induction, but others such as Tammelo (1969) consider analogical argument as a specifically legal
argument for, which on the face of it does not meet the requirements of logical validity, but which
can be reconstructed as logically valid argument. Through reconstruction, validity not only depends
on the formal validity of the argument and the acceptability of the premises, but also on the
procedural standards that indicate whether or not an analogical argument was called for in the first
place and was applied correctly. In this paper, we consider analogy as separate kind of argument
from induction, not only because it is more universal and important than inductive argument in law,
especially in common law, but also because it characterizes those cases where there is not an
already established rule provided in the case of induction as well. Joseph Raz (1979) suggests that a
court can be in two positions, one where a statute or past decision is binding, and one where it is not.
Only in the latter case does analogical argument come into play. According to Raz, a court relies on
analogy whenever it draws on similarities or dissimilarities between the present case and previous
cases which are not binding precedents applying to the present one.
Argument from analogy rests on a similarity between two cases. As we know, any two cases
will be similar in some respects and dissimilar in others. Huhn (2002) suggests that the similarity of
one case to another may be measured on two levels: facts and values. That means one case is
similar to another because they are factually similar or because they imply the same underlying
values. Like an inductive argument, the premises of an analogical argument is only to some extent
evidentially support to its conclusion. Then, how does one ascertain the analogical strength of an
argument? Though there is no mechanical method for precisely measuring the strength of
analogical argument, we can obtain a relative strength by comparing the homogeneity
(heterogeneity) or similarities (dissimilarities) between target case and the precedent. This
comparison can be formulated as following:
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S  Rs  D  Rd
( Rs  0)
S represents the similarities and D represents the dissimilarities of cases. Some of the
characteristics are more significant or carry more weight. Rs and Rd represent the relevant degree
of similarities and dissimilarities to the argument respectively. The size of S contains the number
and the weight of similarities and the size of D contains the number and the weight of
dissimilarities. It shows that the greater the number of similar characteristics between precedent and
target case, the stronger the analogy and the stronger the argument.
Here we have just discussed the comparison between two cases. In practice, there is more than
one similar precedent in a relevant scope when we deal with a new case. Therefore, in order to
choose a precedent we have to use this principle over and over.
3.4. Abductive validity
The arguments at trial usually reason backwards from observed evidence to unobserved causes.
This argument is usually called abduction or argument to the best explanation. Its reasoning
contains three phases: firstly, to find some data or facts; secondly, to seek the explanations to them;
finally, to choose the best explanation and obtain a conclusion, an acceptable hypothesis. Josephson
& Josephson (1994) describe the form of this inference as follows:
(1) D is a collection of data (facts, observations, and givens),
(2) H explains D(would, if true, explain D),
(3) No other hypothesis explains as well as H does.
(4) Therefore, H is probably correct.
From the above scheme we can see that inferential strength of an abductive argument is too
strong: any grounds which have potential causality with given data may be considered as a
conclusion. However, if the premises can end all opposed causations or reasons, the abduction
would translate into necessary reasoning. But reality is not always like this.
Josephson & Josephson suggest that the soundness of an abductive conclusion will in general
depend on several considerations, including:
(1) how good H is by itself, independently of considering the alternatives,
(2) how decisively H surpasses the alternatives,
(3) how thorough the search was for alternative explanations, and
(4) pragmatic considerations including the costs of being wrong and the benefits of being
right and how strong the need is to come to a conclusion at all, especially considering
the possibility of seeking further evidence before deciding.
In abductive argument, we should distinguish between the result and the conclusion. The result
indicates the facts, while the conclusion means the hypothesis or the factors that cause the result.
4. EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
External justification emphasizes the aspect of material content, and deals with the question
whether the facts or legal rules or norms which have been used in internal justification are
acceptable. In logic, people usually say the premises are true not valid. In legal argument, however,
the factual propositions as premises are not the fact itself but legal facts reconstructed by evidence.
It is reasonable to evaluate it by validity. We shall discuss the validity of premises in the following
parts.
4.1. Validity of legal norms
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Webster’s dictionary defines ‘valid’ as ‘having legal force’. ‘This rule is valid’ is the same as ‘This
rule is in force’. As far as the validity of law is concerned, at least three aspects should be separated
from each other. Systemic or formal validity, which is source-oriented or process-oriented, deals
with the hierarchical order of legal norms, i.e. the Kelsenian norm pyramid. Law is valid once it is
made, at least it exists formally. It requires each individual of society to obey if its content is
consistent with social reality. Factual validity, which in conformity to behavior, attitudes and beliefs
of certain social actors, means its actual efficacy contrary to a formal belonging to a system. It is
also called effectivity. Effectivity is a social fact of the legal norms being abided by people. Finally,
seen from the axiological point of view, there are extra-legal or other criteria such as justice giving
the final justification for a legal solution. This validity which is content-oriented is called
axiological validity.
The validity of legal norms in this paper emphasizes the intrinsic property of norms, i.e. the
systemic validity. According to (Wróblewski, 1971), a norm is valid in the systemic sense if and
only if it fulfils the following four conditions:
(1) it has been accepted and promulgated in due course,
(2) the norm has not been repealed,
(3) it is not in contradiction with another norm in force in the same system, and
(4) if there is a contradiction, there is an accepted rule for resolving the conflict.
We can understand norms as both interpretation schemes, the external point of view, and as
motivational basis of the judge, the internal point of view. From the internal point of view, the most
crucial point is the validity of norms. The validity of each individual norm is based upon a rule of
recognition (Hart, 1961). Hart states that only rules of a certain pedigree are valid. Hart states a
given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so
as a rule of the system. In a simple form the systemic validity can be expressed as follows: A norm
is valid if and only if it is a member of a certain normative system, e.g. of a legal code (Aarnio,
1997). In the matter of legal rules, the following conditions must be satisfied for validity: (1) rule
makers have legitimate qualification; (2) they conform to a certain of legal procedures; (3) rules
accord with the purposes of law; and (4) rules are operable.
4.2. Validity of precedents
Arguments in Anglo-American often use precedent cases directly to support a decision in a new
case. Precedents contain concrete applications of legal principles or rules. Precedents themselves
are the conclusions of legal arguments too. The rule of precedent states that similar cares must be
dealt with in similar ways. When earlier cases influence subsequent cases, a legal precedent is said
to apply. This influence may occur in either of two ways. In jurisdictions in which a lower court
must pay deference, the legal precedent will be binding; in jurisdictions in which a lower court need
not pay deference, the legal precedent will be merely persuasive (Woods, Irvine and Walton, 2004).
As far as the validity of a single precedent is concerned, we must make sure that the following
conditions are satisfied: (1) precedent verdicts had been made and become effective; (2) the judicial
decision has not been or should not be overruled. (3) the lower courts are bound to the decisions of
higher courts; (4) precedent verdicts are fairness.
4.3. Validity of legal facts
As we all know, trials are not really searches for the truth but adversarial. The matters of facts of the
case constitute the legal story of the actual events that led to the controversy at hand. Legal facts are
the information on which lawyers base their arguments, in order to win cases in courts of law. In a
trial, the juries (judges) are required to come to determination of what actually happened in the case
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in question. These are the facts of the matter about which juries (judges) make decision, called legal
facts. For the most part, legal facts are those facts in the world or in objective reality. They may
originate in a judge’s interpretations and explanations of the relevant legal rules and statutes, and
may also originate in the verdicts of previous juries that serve as precedents for the case under
consideration.
Legal facts are not real facts, but they are proxy for real facts and are intended to coincide with
them to the highest degree possible. In a legal argument, a true factual premise must be convinced
of being justified or self-evident. At least four features should be considered in ascertaining
legal facts: (1) Knowing the facts is quite impossible if what we mean is that we have all the
facts. (2) We may reasonably disagree among ourselves about what the facts are in any
situation. (3) Characteristic of facts is that many of them do not seem to be stationary and (4)
What is taken as fact depends upon the extent to which observations made by different
persons are corroborative (Johnson, 1946).
The evidence presented during a trial is designed to prove the facts supporting one's argument.
Evidence is the key element in convincing the judge or jury that your facts are the proper ones on
which to base a final decision. It is up to each side in a trial to prove, to the satisfaction of the court
and through the presentation of evidence, the facts needed to support its case. The most common
way in which evidence is presented in court is through oral testimony. The validity of legal facts is
transferred from the validity of evidence.
Generally, the validity of witness testimony is based on the following conditions: (1) the
witnesses must have first-hand knowledge of whatever they are testifying about; (2) they must be
able to remember that first-hand experience at trial; (3) they must be trustworthy themselves; and (4)
they must be able to communicate their thoughts to the jury or judges so that they can understand
what the witnesses are saying.
Furthermore, evidence submitted must be relevant to the argument in question. In general,
the proof of a fact is relevant in a legal proceeding if it is sufficient for the claim or defense
and no exclusionary rules make it inadmissible (Brkic, 1985). Rule FRE-401 of Federal Rules
of Evidence (2004) defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. This rule tells us that evidence is
relevant in an argument if it causes you to change your probabilistic belief about some matter
that is important in this argument.
SUMMARY
Logically, an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises are true and the
conclusion is false. Based on this criterion we can get three types of valid schemes. In legal settings,
however, all false premises could not become the ingredient of an argument, and the false
conclusions followed from true premises are unacceptable. These schemes should be ruled out from
the domain of legal arguments, and only leave one scheme with true premises and true conclusion.
Therefore, not only all false propositions must be ruled out, but more validity constraints to the
premises should be added. This results in the validity of legal argument having the attributes of
soundness of a formal argument. The traditional ways of evaluating such arguments are different.
For example, people use validity to appraise deductive arguments and strength to appraise other
kinds of arguments. We give a general appraisement to the validity of deduction, induction, analogy
and abduction from the point of view of acceptability, and expound the validity system of legal
argument which contains internal validity and the external validity (see Figure 2).
If a legal argument has both internal validity and external validity, we consider it is valid or a
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valid legal argument as a whole. If an argument is found invalid, then all inference should be
suspended because an acceptable legal argument must have the precondition of validity. An invalid
legal argument means that people could not find the reasons to accept it conclusion based on the
existing premises. It should be discarded.
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